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THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010: RULEMAKING IN THE
SHADOW OF INCENTIVE-BASED REGULATION
SAM FOSTER HALABI1
I. Introduction: The Space Between Judicial Review of the Affordable Care Act and Delegated
Authority to Administrative Agencies
The federal courts are unevenly divided in their treatment of the initial constitutional challenges
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“Affordable Care Act”). Two district
judges have ruled that the individual mandate provision of the law exceeds Congress’s constitutional
authority and one has struck down the law in its entirety.2 Many more district judges have used the
Twombly and Iqbal-emboldened Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to turn away similar
challenges across the country.3 Although the question is years from final resolution, it appears that
the 111th Congress internalized U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting its power under the
Commerce Clause, anticipating constitutional challenges to the individual mandate to purchase
health insurance, Medicaid expansion and insurance exchange regimes and structuring the law to
survive those challenges.4 The majority of the district judges who are meticulously combing through
the 2700-plus page legislation, holding hearings and carefully weighing well-funded and sophisticated

Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D. Harvard, 2005; M.Phil. Oxford, 2001; B.A. B.S. Kansas
State University, 1999. The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for comments.
2 On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119. U.S. District Judge Henry Hudson ruled that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause and could not be characterized as a tax. Virginia v. Sebelius, No.
3:10CV188HEH (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010). Judge Vinson struck down the law in its entirety. Florida v. Dep’t of Health
and Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2010)
3 See e.g. Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010); Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-11156-GCS-RSW (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010); Kevin Sack, Judge Rules Health Care
Law is Constitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/08/health/policy/08health.html?_r=1; See also Timothy Jost, Examining Judge
Hudson’s Decision on the Individual Mandate, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG,
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/12/14/examining-judge-hudsons-decision-on-the-individual-mandate/
4 See e.g. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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arguments from multiple constituencies probably have it right.5 Whatever the novelty and reach of
the Affordable Care Act, it requires a narrow reading of the Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court
precedent to decide – to name two possibilities – that the individual mandate does not rationally
serve Congress’s plan for regulating access to health insurance or that tying so much of the reform
law to Medicaid expansion constitutes the only known example of Congress impermissibly coercing
the States with its implied spending power.6 These fights will undoubtedly return in various forms
where other difficult constitutional questions are likely to arise. Specifically, there will be debates
about the substantial powers Congress delegated to regulatory agencies – primarily the Secretary of
Health and Human Services – and the deference the courts will show those agencies in light of
applicable U.S. Supreme Court decisions.7 For example, Richard Epstein has argued that the
Affordable Care Act’s “standardless” delegation of authority to the Secretary of HHS to set essential
benefits packages and monitor premium increases is tantamount to transforming health insurance
providers into public utilities.8 Between facial constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act
and lawsuits based on defects in agency rules or the rulemaking process lies the significant
discretionary area in which the Secretary of HHS, and others, will make the most important
implementation decisions. This Article is intended to provide agencies guidance for shaping the
rules that Congress clearly intended them to adopt and implement, but which courts are less likely to
question. This article argues that (1) Congress demonstrated a strong intent for private enforcement
of the Affordable Care Act’s provisions (especially those expanding Medicare and Medicaid benefits
and eligibility); (2) Congress concurrently included enhancements for private enforcement of
governmental payments programs in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act9 and the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act10; and, therefore, (3) administrative
agencies should structure rules to facilitate private enforcement. The argument proceeds as follows.
Congress, determining that markets (money incentives) are smarter than people (salaried regulators),
expanded the circumstances under which it would pay private citizens to root out and report
improper or fraudulent activity against the taxpayers.11 Because those circumstances are likely to
apply across a wide range of industry sectors, Congress included the enhancements in different
legislative acts. Administrative agencies, especially those overseeing government payments
programs, will advance Congressional mandates for efficiency and effective enforcement by shaping
rules with the aim of facilitating private enforcement. Toward that end, agencies should look
beyond the immediate charging statute for guidance.
II. Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP: Overpayment, Fraud and the Affordable Care Act

See Brendon Farrington, White House, experts: Health care suit will fail, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/mar/23/white-house-experts-health-care-suit-will-fail/.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
7 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
8 Richard Epstein, Impermissible Rulemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill is Unconstitutional, POINT OF LAW,
Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://www.pointoflaw.com/columns/archives/2009/12/impermissible-ratemaking-inhe.php.
9 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009).
10 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
11 This division is of course somewhat simplistic. The “revolving door” between administrative agencies and consulting,
law and lobbying firms (to say nothing of the regulated firms themselves) located at centers of political decision-making
means that regulators will inevitably fashion rules with the knowledge that in the near or distant future they might rely
upon those firms for sometimes highly paid employment.
5
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With respect to the Affordable Care Act, this argument is applicable to the problems of fraud
and abuse that will inevitably accompany the expansion of health entitlements. The most important
health care entitlement programs are Medicare, Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (“CHIP”). Generally, Americans who are 65 years old or younger and disabled are eligible
for Medicare. Medicare is administered by the federal government and is broken into different parts.
Medicare Part A covers hospital insurance.12 Medicare Part B provides insurance against the costs of
certain outpatient services administered by a physician during an office visit as well as “durable
medical equipment” like walkers and wheelchairs.13 Medicare Part C (or Medicare Advantage) allows
private insurers to provide care at the same level as Medicare, but allows certain flexibilities in
coverage and provider choice that may lower costs for recipients.14 Medicare Part D subsidizes the
cost of prescription drugs but does so through private plans that do not offer systematically
standardized coverage.15 Medicaid is the joint federal-state program that is aimed at providing health
care to low-income individuals and families. Medicaid is funded jointly by the federal and state
governments, but states administer the program and determine guidelines for eligibility and service
provision.16 CHIP is aimed at providing health insurance coverage for children in families with
modest incomes that are nevertheless too high for Medicaid eligibility. Its administrative structure
closely resembles Medicaid’s.17
The Affordable Care Act expands eligibility for Medicaid to those making 133% of the federal
poverty line and requires States to add childless adults to the eligible population.18 Previously, a
recipient could not qualify only by virtue of low income. Medicaid only helped those who were at or
below the poverty line and had met another requirement – typically pregnancy, disability, age or
having minor dependents.19 The Affordable Care Act will increase those eligible for Medicaid from
60 million to somewhere between 75 million and 78 million.20 The law also adds certain benefits to
Medicare and CHIP eligible individuals and families.21

Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicarebenefits/part-a.aspx.
13 Medicare Part B (Medical Insurance), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/partb.aspx.
14 Medicare Advantage (Part C), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicare-basics/medicare-benefits/part-c.aspx.
15 What is Part D (Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage), http://www.medicare.gov/navigation/medicarebasics/medicare-benefits/part-d.aspx.
16 See Overview Medicaid Program, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/.
17 See Overview of National CHIP Policy, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
http://www.cms.gov/NationalCHIPPolicy/.
18 Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001 (a) (1). The law adds an 8th categorical eligibility: those who are under 65 years of age,
not pregnant, not entitled to or enrolled for Medicaid benefits under another category. The law
establishes eligibility at 133% of federal poverty level, but allows for an additional 5% modified adjusted gross income.
19 See id.
20 With respect to the number of new Medicaid enrollees, the numbers vary with source. The Congressional Budget
Office estimated that the expansion would increase the number of enrollees in Medicaid and the Children's Health
Insurance Program by about 15 million, costing states about $26 billion over 10 years. The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services estimated that the law would add 18 million people on the Medicaid beneficiary list. An additional 2
million with employer-sponsored health insurance would enroll in Medicaid for supplemental coverage. The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, a group that analyzes health care policy, estimated that Medicaid would enroll as many as 17.1
million new beneficiaries under the health care bill.
21 See e.g. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare and the New Health Care Law – What it Means for You (May
2010), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/11467.pdf.
12
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All stakeholders fear that the increased entitlements will cause negligent and fraudulent
overpayments under the programs to increase. In 2008, the FBI arrested doctors and patients who
submitted over 140,000 false claims for pretending to receive expensive HIV- drug treatments.22 On
October 13, 2010, federal and state law enforcement officials indicted 44 individuals for billing
Medicare for over $100 million for “services” that were never provided at phantom clinics.23 One
pharmacist bilked Medicaid for over $1.8 million in less than a year by submitting phony claims for
prescriptions that he never filled.24 Yet not all of the improprieties are so sensational. Because
Medicaid and Medicare “pay and chase” – that is, reimburse claims as a matter of course and then
pursue improper billing later – millions of dollars are also lost for services, drugs, or supplies that are
unnecessary, not performed or are of a lower quality or more costly than those that are actually
performed.25 “Major corporations such as pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers and
institutions such as hospitals and nursing facilities have also committed fraud, sometimes on a grand
scale.” 26 Physicians may refer patients to providers with whom they share a financial interest and
create incentives to raise costs or pay kick-backs, but Congress has curtailed such practices with the
so-called Stark Law.27 In addition, providers benefit from what appear to be even benign mistakes.
For example, charging a patient for an “office visit” when he or she only visited for a flu shot, is a
tactic known as “upcoding” that results in a higher reimbursement for the health care provider.28
Sensing that the known difficulties of monitoring reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid
might present opponents with arguments against expansion of entitlements, Congress included
measures to more effectively screen applicants for Medicare and Medicaid participation, encourage
information sharing across law enforcement agencies and toughen penalties and the means by which
they are collected.
III. The Regulatory Structure of Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP
Medicare and Medicaid providers are regulated generally by the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) and specifically by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) which oversee enrollment, reimbursement, monitoring and enforcement policies applicable
to health care providers under Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP.29 Both the HHS Office of the
Inspector General and CMS also maintain integrity units that investigate reimbursement patterns
and individual claims to detect billing errors and unusual medical treatment. Under the Medicaid

Carrie Johnson, Medical Fraud a Growing Problem, WASH. POST (June 13, 2008), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/12/AR2008061203915_2.html.
23 Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges 44 Members and Associates of an ArmenianAmerican Organized Crime Enterprise with $100 Million Medicare Fraud (Oct. 13, 2010), available at
http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo101310.htm.
24 Melissa Grace, Pharmacist Patrick Alcindor Stole $18 million from Taxpayers in Medicaid Fraud Scheme, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/11/04/2010-1104_pharmacist_patrick_alcindor_stole_18m_from_taxpayers_in_medicaid_fraud_scheme_la.html.
25 See Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 58238 (proposed
Sept. 23, 2010).
26 Testimony of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Services, Mar. 4, 2010, available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2010/3-4-10LevinsonHAppropsSub.pdf.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn; 42 C.F.R. §§411.350-411.389.
28 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE
CLAIMS PROCESSING MANUAL, at 12, available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/downloads/clm104c18.pdf.
29 Law enforcement agencies at the federal and state level also work with the HHS OIG and CMS.
22
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program, states also maintain fraud control units to monitor payments to providers.30 Yet CMS
concedes that the job is overwhelming.31 In 2008, CMS reviewed less than 5% of Medicare claims.32
State Medicaid reviewers are similarly inundated.33
CMS adopts some form of command-and-control, performance standard and incentive-based
regulation as part of administering Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP.34 These categories provide a
useful taxonomy by which to understand theories of regulation even if in practice the line between
them blurs and some forms of regulation might fall outside of these neat descriptions.
Loosely defined, command-and-control rules impose specific requirements on regulated firms. For
instance, a polluter might be required to adopt a particular type of technology designed to limit the
quantity of pollution. Performance-based standards tell firms what they must accomplish but leave
them to decide how best to do so. Such a standard, for example, might specify the maximum
quantity of pollution that a firm may produce without specifying the means by which the firm is
required to comply. Finally, incentive-based systems force firms to internalize the total costs of their
activities, leaving firms to decide what, if anything, to do about those costs.35 CMS, for example,
now requires a provider to have a compliance and ethics program in place “that is effective in
preventing and detecting criminal, civil, and administrative violations and in promoting quality care .
. . .”36 Performance standards are imposed to varying degrees on providers of specific services in
order to qualify for participation in Medicare and Medicaid.37 For example, a state may require that
providers of certain services or durable medical equipment meet established financial or health
outcome criteria in order to continue participating in the Medicaid program.38 Incentive-based
regulation in these programs takes two primary forms: the False Claims Act and Recovery Audit
Contractors.
IV. Incentive-based Regulation in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs
A. The False Claims Act

U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, MEDICAID FRAUD CONTROL UNITS
(MFCU). available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/mfcu.
31 Johnson, supra note 23.
32 Id.
33 See e.g. John Lyon, Lawmakers review Medicaid audit, ARKANSAS NEWS, April 9, 2010, available at
http://arkansasnews.com/2010/04/09/lawmakers-review-medicaid-audit/; Tyley Whitley, Va. Medicaid paid out $39
million improperly in fiscal 2009, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2010, available at
http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2010/oct/13/medi13-ar-559304/.
34 Kimberly Brandt, Director, Program Integrity Group, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Services, Testimony before
Committee on Ways and Means on Reducing Fraud, Waste and Abuse in Medicare (June 15, 2010), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2010/06/t20100615a.html.
35 See Jon Hanson & Kyle Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1173-74 (1998).
36 Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 58238 (proposed
Sept. 23, 2010).
37 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, PROVIDER
ENROLLMENT REGULATION, available at
https://www.cms.gov/MedicareProviderSupEnroll/09_ProviderEnrollmentRegulation.asp.
38 James W. Fossett et. al., Managing Medicaid Managed Care: Are States Becoming Prudent Purchasers?, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 36
(2000).
30
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Incentive-based regulation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs is both old and new. Claims
submitted to either program are subject to private litigation under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).39
Enacted during the Civil War to combat fraud on the Union army, the FCA is the United States’
primary tool for fighting fraud directed against the public coffers.40 Under the False Claims Act
regime, private citizens (“whistleblowers” or “relators”) work closely with the U.S. Department of
Justice to identify inappropriate claims submitted to the government for payment.41 In 1986,
Congress strengthened its qui tam provisions to allow whistleblowers to file suit under seal on behalf
of the United States and share up to 30 percent of the United States’ ultimate recovery.42 While the
qui tam complaint is under seal, and before it is served on the defendant, the United States
Department of Justice investigates to decide whether to intervene and take over the prosecution of
the action or decline to intervene and allow the whistleblower to proceed.43 The United States is the
real party in interest, even in cases where it declines.44 The FCA establishes liability for any person
who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval.45 “Knowledge” is defined broadly to include actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance of the
truth, or reckless disregard of the truth. A corporation is deemed to have knowledge if its employee
acted knowingly.46 Whistleblower suits initiated under the FCA between 1987 and 2008 have
resulted in the return of approximately $22 billion in improper payments and damages.47
1. The Affordable Care Act Encourages the Use of the FCA to Combat Fraud
The Affordable Care Act explicitly expanded access to private litigants suing under the FCA.
First, Congress directly linked the retention of overpayments to false claim liability. Under the
Affordable Care Act, “overpayments” are defined as “any [Medicare or Medicaid] funds that a
person receives or retains . . . to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled.”48
Health care providers, suppliers, Medicaid managed care organizations, Medicare Advantage
organizations and drug plan sponsors must “report and return” any overpayments within 60 days
after either the date on which the overpayment was identified or the date any corresponding cost
report was due, whichever is later.49 In addition, members of the health care industry must submit
notification in writing to the entity to which the overpayment was returned as to the reason of the
overpayment.50

31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. (2010).
See United States ex tel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551 (1943).
41 Id.
42 False Claims Act Amendments Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153. The U.S., in turn, is awarded treble damages and
can impose civil fines between $5,000 and $10,000 per claim. The phrase “qui tam” is an abbreviated form of qui tam pro
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, is translated by Blackstone as “who prosecutes this action for the king, etc.
as for himself.” In the English common law, the writ was historically available to citizens to enforce the king’s laws. 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1154 (1765).
43 See FED. R. CIV. P. 17.
44 See id.
45 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
46 See, e.g., United States v. Entin, 750 F. Supp. 512, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1990); cf. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278
U.S. 349 (1929).
47 JACK A. MEYER, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FIGHTING MEDICARE FRAUD: MORE BANG FOR
THE FEDERAL BUCK (July 2006), available at http://www.taf.org/FCA-2006report.pdf.
48 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
49 Id.
50 Id.
39
40
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Second, Congress used the Affordable Care Act to expand access to whistleblowers who identify
fraudulent practices by allowing them to use publicly disclosed information. Previously, such
information was unavailable to them due to limiting court decisions that fashioned a “Public
Disclosure Bar” to claims that relied in significant part on publicly available information.51 Section
10104(j)(2) of the law replaces the prior version § 3730(e)(4) of the FCA with new language that
expands the scope of the original source exception and shifts the Public Disclosure Bar from a
jurisdictional prohibition to a more flexible standard, with discretionary power held by the
government.52 One important effect of the change is to enable whistleblowers to use information
available from a state Medicaid hearing or process in order to establish a claim under the FCA.53
These FCA amendments are not limited to qui tam cases involving federal health care programs.54
2. Congress Concurrently Enacted FCA Enhancements in the Fraud Enforcement
Recovery Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
In the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”), Congress included
enhancements to the FCA. Most significantly for purposes of Medicare and Medicaid, Congress
expanded the number of actors upon whom fraud would support a “claim” under the FCA;
included the retention of government overpayments as a basis for FCA liability; broadened the
scope of conspiracy under the FCA; enhanced protections for whistleblowers against retaliation;
and, bolstered the government’s investigative powers.55 For example, under judicial interpretations
of the FCA prior to FERA, a skilled nursing facility might contract out certain physical therapy
treatments.56 Because the physical therapy provider did not directly submit claims to Medicare or

See Graham County Soil v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010). The amendments legislatively overruled Graham County
Soil v. U.S. in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the public disclosure bar was intended to limit whistleblowers' ability to use secondhand information to generate false claims cases.
52 Under § 10104(j)(2) of the Affordable Care Act, the government now has the ability to control whether a qui tam
complaint is dismissed based on publicly disclosed information. Section 10104(j)(2) provides:
Section (4)(A). The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if
substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed: (i) in a Federal
criminal, civil or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party;(ii) in a Congressional,
Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit or investigation; or (iii) from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.
The Affordable Care Act also narrows the definition of publicly disclosed information and expands the scope of the
original source exception. The new language also widens the definition of an “original source” by eliminating the
requirement that a whistleblower have "direct" knowledge of facts underlying his or her allegations. A qui tam
whistleblower need only have "knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations
. . . ." Under the new law, a whistleblower's allegations can now be based on indirect information, provided those
allegations add to information that is already contained in the public domain. The public disclosure must also result
from a federal report, hearing, audit or investigation. Public disclosures in state or local government reports also no
longer bar the whistleblower’s claim.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617. FERA rolled back judicial
decisions that had limited the FCA’s reach, including Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123
(2008); United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1032 (2005);
and United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), rev'd, 562 F.3d 295 (4th
Cir. 2009).
56 David S. Barmak, Providers/suppliers beware: expansion of the False Claims Act, LEXOLOGY, Nov. 1, 2010, available
at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=32d3b9a3-1ce9-4cd8-9f22-27ee7c847328.
51
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Medicaid, an FCA claim could not prevail against the therapist.57 The amendments to the law
corrected this defect.
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“financial reform law”),
Congress created a uniform three-year statute of limitations period for claims of retaliation by
whistleblowers and widened FERA’s definition of acts protected by the retaliation cause of action.58
These measures demonstrate an identifiable intent from Congress to use “private attorneys general”
in the expanding areas in which government payments are made and might be fraudulently obtained.
B. Recovery Audit Contractors
In 2003, Congress required Medicare (not Medicaid) to enact a pilot program whereby private
auditing entities – recovery audit contractors (“RACs”) – would be given incentive to hunt down
overpayments or improper billing submissions by health care providers.59 RACs typically review a
sample of a health care provider’s claims for a given period and determine an error rate. RACs then
generalize the error rate over the universe of claims during the audit period to calculate an alleged
overpayment amount.60 The amount sought to be recouped by CMS based on the extrapolation
from a relatively small sample of claims billed can be large. The RACs are paid a contingency fee
based on the overpayment amount, which may provide their auditors with an incentive to find
claims that they contend should have been denied. Between 2005 and 2007, the private auditors
returned $693.6 million to the Medicare Trust Funds.61 The Affordable Care Act expanded RAC
contracting to all Medicare programs and required States to contract with RACs for Medicaid
audits.62 As with FERA and the financial reform law, the expansion of the RAC program shows a
clear mandate from Congress to mobilize incentive-based regulation of healthcare providers that
submit claims for reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid.
V. Rulemaking in the Shadow of Incentive Based Regulation
A. CMS Cannot Effectively Monitor Fraud and Waste with Current or Promised Resources
Prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the General Accounting Office issued regular
reports which indicated that CMS could not keep pace with enforcement demands. On June 28,
2005, the GAO reported that CMS had only 8 employees devoted to chasing down improper
Medicaid billing.63 On March 3, 2010, the GAO reported that between 2005 and 2008, CMS had
failed to ensure that Medicare Part D drug plan providers had implemented policies to prevent and

Id.
See 31 U.S.C. §3730(h).
59 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, REVIEW AUDIT
CONTRACTOR OVERVIEW, available at https://www.cms.gov/RAC/.
60 Deborah J. Juneau, Recovery Audit Contractor Program Will Be Expanded to Medicaid, LOUISIANA LAW BLOG, Sept. 2, 2010,
http://www.louisianalawblog.com/health-law-recovery-audit-contractor-program-will-be-expanded-to-medicaid.html.
61 Press Release, Dep’t. of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, New Report Shows
CMS Pilot Program Saving Nearly $700 Million in Improper Medicare Payments (July 11, 2008), available at
http://mailcenter.newmediagateway.com/healthport/files/flash_docs/public/0/RAC_press_release.pdf.
62 Id.
63 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE: CMS’S COMMITMENT TO HELPING STATES
SAFEGUARD PROGRAM DOLLARS IS LIMITED (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05855t.pdf.
57
58
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catch fraud and waste.64 The same month, GAO reported that even where RACs had identified
weaknesses in provider billing processes, CMS failed to act on its recommendations.65 The GAO
reports focus generally on the universe of command-and-control and performance standards
regulations that are in place but have not been implemented because the HHS OIG or CMS are
unable – by virtue of resource scarcity – to coordinate or enforce.
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, Congress increased the budget for HHS’s
oversight activities by approximately $35 million per year for ten years and mandated the
development of better screening and data-sharing processes.66 Yet these enhancements will not
realize their intended effect if enforcement activity is centered in the regulatory agency instead of
using whistleblowers and RACs to facilitate actions by regulators and prosecutors. Fraud and waste
are the natural effect of rent-seeking market actors who are exploiting a system whose resource
constraints limit its policing ability. The historical lesson is that similarly motivated market actors
are most effectively positioned to root out fraudulent or inaccurate billing practices.
B. HHS and CMS Should Shape Rules to Facilitate Incentive-Based Regulatory Mechanisms
When developing and implementing regulations, administrative agencies should explicitly
consider Congress’s efforts to force health care providers to internalize the costs related to
overbilling and mistakes, even if that authority lies outside an immediate charging statute. This
consideration includes but is not limited to (1) interpreting statutes in order to maximize the
opportunity for private enforcement and (2) coordinating instructional materials and billing practices
in order to avoid conflicts with private litigants (or the Department of Justice with whom
whistleblowers coordinate).
1. Drafting Rules from the Perspective of Private Enforcement
Potential whistleblowers and RACs are likely to (1) know the exact wording of statutes and
regulations well and (2) give the text of statutes and regulations a strict reading in order to increase
the incidence of overbilling and the size of their awards. Rule-making in the shadow of incentivebased regulation counsels HHS and CMS to take measures that give effect to the clear intent of
Congress (both inside and outside the Affordable Care Act) to promote these strict readings.
Consider the example of the Affordable Care Act’s provisions prohibiting health care providers
from retaining overpayments. The law states that any overpayment retained after the deadline
becomes an “obligation” for purposes of the FCA.67 Therefore, a failure to return any Medicare or
Medicaid overpayments by the deadline may result in FCA liability. In order to avoid such liability,
CMS will inevitably require health care providers and other entities receiving reimbursement under
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE PART D: CMS OVERSIGHT OF PART D SPONSORS' FRAUD AND ABUSE
PROGRAMS HAS BEEN LIMITED, BUT CMS PLANS OVERSIGHT EXPANSION (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-481T.
65 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE AUDIT CONTRACTING: WEAKNESSES REMAIN IN ADDRESSING
VULNERABILITIES TO IMPROPER PAYMENTS , ALTHOUGH IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO CONTRACT OVERSIGHT (2010),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10143.pdf.
66 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Services, HHS Secretary Sebelius, U.S. Attorney General Holder KickOff First Regional Health Care Fraud Prevention Summit in Miami, Florida (July 16, 2010), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100716a.html.s
67 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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Medicare or Medicaid to implement policies and procedures on reporting and returning
overpayments that are consistent with the requirements in the Affordable Care Act. CMS will also
have to adopt regulations that govern those policies.
The statutory language itself does not give guidance as to when an overpayment is “identified”
and the position likely to be taken by providers’ counsel is that overpayment has not been
“identified” until the provider has “(1) absolutely concluded that there is an overpayment and
(2) ascertained the amount of the overpayment.”68 The narrower reading likely to be given by
whistleblowers is that an overpayment has been “identified” where there is much less than an
“absolute conclusion” and well before an exact amount has been precisely calculated. The narrower
reading is more consistent with Congress’s actions in concurrent legislation expanding
whistleblowers’ access to the courts under the FCA.
a. Early Signs that CMS will not Rely on Incentive-Based Regulation: The SelfReporting Disclosure Protocol under the Stark Law
Early guidance, protocols and rules proposed by HHS and CMS instead seem to hint at a
centrifugal perspective whereby HHS and CMS reserve for themselves the greatest amount of
discretion in the greatest number of cases. There are some early indications that CMS is opting for
rules that will add to its already significant burden instead of harnessing the incentives provided for
private litigants.
Take the example of the self-referral disclosure protocol that was required for the Stark Law.
This protocol governs the types of arrangements physicians can maintain with health care providers
in which they have a financial interest.69 Section 6409 of the Affordable Care Act requires the
Secretary of HHS, in cooperation with the HHS Office of the Inspector General to establish a
Medicare self-referral disclosure protocol (“SRDP”) for providers of services and suppliers to selfdisclose actual or potential violations of the Stark Law.70 Section 6409 requires the Secretary of
HHS to inform providers of services and suppliers of how to disclose an actual or potential violation
pursuant to the protocol through publication on the CMS website.71 Section 6409 also mandates
that the SRDP must include direction to health care providers of services and suppliers on the
specific person, official, or office to whom such disclosures shall be made and instruction on the
implication of the SRDP on corporate integrity agreements and corporate compliance agreements.72
Section 6409(b) grants the Secretary of HHS the authority to reduce the amounts due for all
violations of the Stark Law.73 In establishing the amount by which an overpayment resulting from
an actual or potential violation(s) may be reduced, the Secretary may consider: the nature and extent
of the improper or illegal practice; the timeliness of such disclosure; the cooperation in providing
additional information related to the disclosure; and such other factors as the Secretary considers

Barbara Vandegrift, Warning: Report and Return Overpayments in 60 Days or Risk False Claims Act, HEALTHCARE FINANCE
NEWS, June 1, 2010, available at http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/blog/warning-report-and-returnoverpayments-60-days-or-risk-false-claims-act.
69 See 42 U.S.C. §1393nn.
70 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL,
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL,
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf.
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appropriate.74Pursuant to the statute, the CMS-proposed SDRP allows providers to send an email
disclosing an actual or potential violation which would suspend the 60 day period otherwise given to
the provider to return overpayments.75 CMS will subsequently investigate the disclosure. While the
protocol requires providers to report in “good faith,” the upshot is to permit providers to escape
private enforcement against overpayments by turning to overstretched regulators to determine (1)
whether they, in fact, reported in good faith and (2) to assess for themselves the culpability of the
provider.76 While the Affordable Care Act grants the Secretary of HHS the authority to reduce the
amounts owed under the Stark Law, there is no requirement that she do so and the force of
Congressional enactments in FERA and the financial reform law counsels that she reduce
overpayments only in limited circumstances. If the regulations are formed in that way, private actors
will discover improper payments more readily and providers will act under a greater incentive to
ensure that their contracts with physicians are lawful.
b. Suspending Overpayments for Credible Allegations of Fraud
Similarly, in its proposed rule implementing the Affordable Care Act’s provisions which suspend
payments under Medicare and Medicaid for credible allegations of fraud, CMS proposes that it
review “all allegations, facts, and information carefully and act judiciously on a case-by-case basis
when contemplating a payment suspension, mindful of the impact that payment suspension may
have upon a provider.”77 CMS further proposes to provide four exceptions for suspension.78 These
exceptions would include an exception for “a determination by CMS that a payment suspension is
not in the best interests of the Medicare program.”79 The net effect of these proposals appears to be
further centralization of both rulemaking and enforcement in the hands of CMS. As it concedes and
the GAO confirms, the CMS is overburdened with existing command-and-control and performance
standards-based regulatory structures.
2.

Coordinating Existing Manuals and Payments Practices to Facilitate Incentive-Based
Regulation

Furthermore, CMS should review its existing manuals, guidance and protocols to ensure that
they are consistent with RAC bill auditing practices and that they do not hinder FCA claims. As
with shaping rules from the perspective of private litigants, incentive-based regulation is facilitated
by clearly defining payment practices and ensuring that processors comply with stated policies.
Inconsistencies between regulations and payment manuals have frequently led courts to require
reimbursements regarded as improper by CMS.80 Recovery Audit Contractors’ efforts to recoup
overpayments have been thwarted where Medicare Appeals Councils find that CMS manuals
The provider cannot simultaneously request an advisory opinion from HHS.
https://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/95_advisory_opinions.asp#TopOfPage.
75 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, CMS VOLUNTARY SELF-REFERRAL DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL,
http://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/Downloads/6409_SRDP_Protocol.pdf.
76 Id.
77 75 Fed. Reg. 184 p. 58222.
78 Id. at 58223.
79 Id.. In the case of a State agency determination for Medicaid, the exception would be a State agency’s determination
that it was not in the interest of the Medicaid program.
80 See e.g. Maximum Home Health Care Inv. v. Shalala, 272 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2001); National Medical Enterprises v.
Bowen, 851 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1988); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
CONSULTATIONS IN MEDICARE: CODING AND REIMBURSEMENT, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-0200030.pdf.
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contained inconsistent language as to the validity of a claim.81 Conversely, private litigants, and, for
that matter, the Department of Justice, are thwarted where payments appear to be improper under
regulations or payment manuals, but CMS informally deems the payment valid and pays as a matter
of course.82
VI. Conclusion
This Article might be misconstrued as a targeted criticism of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, but that is not its aim. CMS administers a massive health insurance scheme more
efficiently than its private-sector counterparts.83 Moreover, implementation of the Affordable Care
Act will require coordinated activity of agencies housed within the Department of Labor, the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture and others for which this argument is
equally applicable. Agencies administering statutory schemes that involve government payments
should be attuned to Congress’s clear intent to mobilize private citizens who have information
showing that the taxpayers are being duped or overcharged. While whistleblower law firms and the
Department of Justice are able to participate in the comments-on-rulemaking process, ultimate
action will be left in the hands of the agencies. Indeed, it is unlikely under any of the prevailing
standards of review that their failure to consider relevant Congressional intent located in noncharging statutes would be subject to a court’s scrutiny. Instead, rulemaking that facilitates private
enforcement is justified ethically by the idea that Congress is the more democratic source of
authority and practically by the fact that private litigants may ease agencies’ already significant
burden.

Order of Medicare Appeals Council in the case of O’Connor Hospital, available at
http://www.hhs.gov/dab/divisions/medicareoperations/macdecisions/oconnorhospital.pdf.
82 Shoes for Amputees? Medicare waste revealed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26860289.
83 The point is fiercely contested. On the raw numbers, Medicare appears to incur overhead expenses of about 4% while
private sector insurers report overhead costs of about 12%. See National Health Plan Could Save Billions in Paperwork: Study,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Jan. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/health_plan.html#ixzz0iO90Khxd. Many argue that those numbers do not
accurately capture the economic picture. Robert Book, Ph.D., Medicare Administrative Costs Are Higher, Not Lower, Than for
Private Insurance, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 25, 2009), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/06/medicare-administrative-costs-are-higher-not-lower-than-forprivate-insurance.
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